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In the last article I argued that there was no morally relevant difference between acts as a class and omissions as a class, and, in particular, between that subclass of actions described as killings and that subclass of omissions described as allowing to die. Does that mean that the widespread and deeply held intuition-widespread within law, medicine, and religion-that there is a morally important distinction here should simply be rejected? Does it mean that Clough's couplet: "Thou shalt not kill; but needs't not strive Officiously to keep alive" should be regarded as no more than the satiric piece of nonsense he probably intended it to be? Strictly speaking I think the answer is yes; but two more or less related moral distinctions, while action that has a bad effect is permissible if (a) the action is good in itself, (b) the intention is solely to produce the good effect, (c) the good effect is not achieved through the bad effect, and (d) there is sufficient reason to permit the bad effect."
Only the fourth of those clauses is fairly uncontroversial (and widely accepted as vitally important to philosophical medical ethics). It requires that a bad effect may be risked or brought about only if there is "sufficient" (or, as some writers put it, "proportionately grave"2) reason to do so. In other words, there may be justification for bringing about or risking evil but only if the good expected is sufficiently weighty to overcome the usual prohibition against doing so. Of course, the clause raises a host of associated issues, including the problem of how one balances goods and evils against one another and the important and underinvestigated issues of risk and medical ethics.'2-Clearly, in deciding whether a bad effect is justified in the pursuit of a good effect not only must the relevant "weights" of each be assessed but also their respective probabilities. The lower the probability of their occurrence the more both harms and benefits must be discounted. There is no substantial doubt, however, that it may be entirely legitimate to take an action to try to achieve some Thus for non-absolutists the first clause is too demanding; but it does importantly remind us that one's proposed action may in itself be morally unacceptable quite apart from its consequences. Ifso the pluralist would seek to "weigh" the evil-intrinsic to the proposed action against any good that itwould be likely to achieve, as required in the fourth clause. The difficulties of such weighing, to which I have repeatedly alluded, will seem to the pluralist less morally objectionable than the counterintuitive results of absolutism.
Intention to produce a good effect The second clause requires that "the intention is solely to produce the good effect." There are at least two problems with this. The first is that when one knows that a bad effect will result from one's action then it seems to be simply self deceiving, perhaps hypocritical, to say that one does not intend it' Imagine a. surgeon saying that he does not intend the patient's loss ofa leg as he puts him on the list for an amputation, that he merely foresees that result, that his intention is only to save the patient from dying from disseminated cancer. The second problem is that even when it is only probable that an unintended bad effect will occur-for example, that a patient will become sterile from cytotoxic chemotherapy-there remains a general assumption that as moral agents we should accept moral responsibility for effects we foreseeingly cause, even though we do not intend them. Most would go further and say we should accept moral responsibility for effects the risks of which we ought to have foreseen, even if we have not foreseen them. If these assumptions are accepted then we cannot get off the moral hook simply by saying, however truthfully, that, although we foresaw the probability ofacertain bad result, we did not intend that result, only the good result.'" What analysis of this clause of the principle of double effect does seem to show is that for a careful moral evaluation of an action or proposed action it is important to distinguish between (a) the intended end and the intended means to that end; (b) the intended results, whether means or ends, ofone's actions and the unintendedbut foreseen risks of side effects of one's action; (c) the desired results and intended results-doctors and their patients repeatedly intend, as means to some desirable result, certain undesirable results; and (d) the overall result, all things considered, of one's proposed action and the individual components of that overall result. For each of these distinctions it seems possible to suggest morally plausible medical examples in which one disjunct is bad, the other good, and in which provided one can reasonably expect to achieve a balance of good over evil and provided that that balance meets the "proportionality" requirements of the crucial fourth clause of the principle, then the proposed action would be justifiable.
Justification of good ends by bad means
The third clause of the doctrine, according to which the good effect must not be achieved by means of the bad effect is again likely to be rejected by non-absolutists as counterintuitive on the grounds that sometimes it is justifiable to achieve a good end by a bad means. The example of the amputation above seems an obvious example, though perhaps every surgical operation affords one. Thus to be deprived of a leg is obviously a horrible effect of the decision to amputate; but if removal of that leg is the least damaging way of securing a reasonable chance of saving a patient's life, and assuming that that is 'what the patient wants, then few would reject such treatment, given the magnitude ofthe be'nefit predicted, despite the fact that the good effect can be achieved only by means of the bad effect, thus transgressing this third clause of the doctrine of double effect. (Heroic redescriptions of the amputation to avoid this conflict are frankly unconvincing.) The conffict between good and bad effects would be assessed by those who rejected this clause by appeal, once again, to the requirement of proportionality or sufficient reason in the fourth clause.
In summary then, while the doctrine of double effect points up some important facts about the nature ofmoral judgment, including the need, when judging the morality of actions, to take the agent's intentions into account, it is unlikely to be accepted in full by nonabsolutists (antSsindeed rejected by many Roman Catholics). What remains virtually unassailed are its claims (a)-that evil can rightly be done or even risked only in the pursuit of doing good and (b) that evil may rightly be done or even risked only if there is sufficiently weighty (or proportionately grave) reason to justify it. As doctors acquire ever more dangerous and unpleasant techniques in their unremitting quest to benefit their patients these residual components of the doctrine of double effect crucially serve both to justify and to restrict their application.
